CSN PRESS ROOM: Demystifying Complexities around Antibody Research at the Universal Ostrich Farm

Requesting Clarification from University Research Professor Dr. Steven Pelech

CSNews has obtained further information with reference to the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s order for a culling of all of the ostriches at the United Ostrich Farm in Edgewood, BC.

On May 21, 2025 the co-owners of the ostrich farm, Karen Espersen & Dave Bilinski, posted an official statement outlining responses to many questions they were receiving directly or via social media. It can be found here: https://saveourostriches.com/press-releases/official-statement-from-universal-ostrich-farms-inc-may21-2025/

CSNews has reached out to one of the two university research professors who provided documentation as part of the judicial review that took place on February 15 & 16, 2025.

Steven Pelech, Ph.D.

Professor, Division of Neurology,

Department of Medicine, University of British Columbia

Senate Representative for Faculty of Graduate and Post-doctoral Studies

President & Chief Scientific Officer

Kinexus Bioinformatics Corporation

Co-Chair, Scientific and Medical Advisory Committee

VP, Canadian Citizens Care Alliance

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The first section below contains points CSNews has pulled from a written statement provided by Dr. Pelech on May 21, 2025.

The second section outlines Dr. Pelech’s replies to questions put to him by CSNews.

The final section contains Dr. Pelech’s written statement in entirety.

NOTE:

• Highlights in bold have been added by CSNews.

• These two terms occur frequently:

  • INFECTIVE = Ability to cause infection.

  • PATHOGENIC = Ability to cause harmful disease

  • A pathogen might be highly pathogenic, but not that infective. It could be slow to transmit from one person to another but can cause serious symptoms.

  • Later, due to various mutations, new variants of the same pathogen might become more infectious but often less pathogenic. This means infections can spread more quickly but symptoms would be less severe and of a shorter duration. Less pathogenic, more infectious variants of a pathogen often displace more pathogenic predecessors, because the infected host is unaware of their infection and is more likely to interact with other potential hosts.

Part 1: Key Points

1. The decision of the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) to cull all birds in a flock or herd upon evidence of a single PCR confirmed case of H5 or H7 positivity is an internal decision of the CFAI. This is not a requirement of the World Organization for Animal Health, which allows for regaining of disease-free status after one year if no other outbreaks occur in a zone.

2. Canada is divided into zones with respect to commercial poultry. The Universal Ostrich Farm (UOF) is in its own zone, and allowing the disease to “burn-out” at the UOF zone does not affect the disease-free status of the other zones in BC and Canada.

3. The CFAI, according to its own rules, has discretion with respect on how to handle an outbreak of H5N1 in unusual cases.

4. The H5N1 strain of Avian Influenza has been known for almost 70 years, and it has yet to pose a serious threat for human disease. Infections of human hosts are rare. There is no scientific evidence that the H5N1 virus has been able to spread to and cause disease from human to human contact. In the US and Canada in the last 4 years, there have only been a little over 70 confirms cases of animal to human contact of H5N1 virus, and most of these have had mild if any symptoms.

5. The CFAI has been preoccupied with the notion that genetic mutation of H5N1 may allow it to develop greater infectivity and pathogenicity in humans, and result in the next human virus pandemic.

6. At the end of December 2024, after the initial testing of the two dead birds, using a PCR test designed to test for influenza hemagglutinin H5 and H7 genetic material, the CFIA had a positive result. The CFAI did not know specifically at the time that the virus detected was H5N1 or even necessarily a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. At the thermal cycle number of this PCR test, which exceeded 36 cycles, the test has a greater than 90% false positive rate.

7. To issue a cull order, the current CFAI policy is that if a poultry flock is even suspected of having an H5N1 infection, and even a single bird tests positive for H5 or H7, then the entire flock to which that bird has been exposed must be exterminated.

8. The influenza virus recovered from these birds was a combination of high and low pathogenicity virus, so it would not be expected to be considered ‘highly pathogenic’. To qualify as highly pathogenic, lethality has to be 75% or higher in an infected chicken herd.

9. The 69 birds that died since the outbreak started on December 10 reflect a 31% fatality rate. (69 out of the total birds new to the farm after 2020.) This rate is much lower than the 60% lethality rate elsewhere. In South Africa, ostriches remaining in herds with a 60% fatality rate are not culled.

10. By applying the stamping out policy at the earliest signs of an H5 or H7 influenza infection, we presently have no idea how lethal the currently circulating strains of influenza are in wild birds or the domestic flocks.

11. According to the CFIA, there have been about 531 outbreaks of H5N1 High Pathogenic Avian Influenza (HPAI) in commercial poultry flocks in Canada in the last four years. And with one exception, the exposed birds were all subjected to the stamping out policy, resulting in the deaths of over 14.5 million commercial birds.

12. At least one farm has been infected on 4 separate occasions, which demonstrates that culling is not effective in preventing future infections.

14. A substantial portion of the H5N1 influenza that is now in wild migratory birds is no longer highly pathogenic avian influenza, but hybrids of lower pathogenicity.

15. Normally, pandemics subside when less lethal and more infectious strains of viruses emerge from mutation and outcompete highly pathogenic versions. It is likely that such a phenomenon is already happening with H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, which was responsible for HPAI cases earlier in the recent pandemic in commercial livestock.

16. The notion that influenza virus may remain replication-competent for years in water and soil (a concern raised by Justice Zinn, based on the material submitted by the CFIA) is a misleading idea. It was rebutted by both Dr. Bridle and Dr. Pelech, because it did not account for microbial action and the destruction of the influenza virus by ultraviolet radiation in sunlight.

17. The culling of the UOF herd represents a huge loss to the scientific community to understand the effectiveness of natural immunity post-infection with H5N1 virus in birds. Culling these birds will damage the ostrich antibody industry in Canada which has wider implications for biomedical applications. Ostrich antibodies could be used for diagnostic tests to identify new outbreaks of infections with these viruses as well as therapeutic antibodies for treatment of influenza and COVID-19.

18. Ostriches take more than a year to become reproductive and it takes a few years before an ostrich is comfortable with a human handler, so it takes years to re-establish an ostrich herd.

19. According to CFAI policy, the agency is not required to pay fair compensation for the value of animals that are culled when they issue an order. Justice Zinn ruled that the compensation cannot exceed $3000 per bird. Therefore, the true value of these birds will not be offered in compensation.

Part 2: Additional Q & A

1. Possible vested interests in antibody research?

Q: Dr. Pelech, given that you own a company that sells antibodies, people might wonder whether you have a vested interest in supporting antibody research on this farm. What has been the connection between your company and this farm?

A: Kinexus had no previous connection with the UOF prior to the influenza outbreak in December 2024. After being contacted by colleagues at the University of Guelph about the UOF situation, I was asked to evaluate whether the UOF ostriches had antibodies against the H5N1 influenza virus to determine if they had natural immunity. My previous experience with SARS-CoV-2 and testing for antibodies against this virus with the unique technology in Kinexus allowed us to do this.

Unfortunately, the CFIA would not allow for testing of materials from any of the UOF birds after their cull order. However, I was able to test egg yolks from the UOF ostriches that were collected in the summer of 2024 and determined that for 18 out of 18 ostrich egg samples tested each had multiple antibodies that recognized unique parts of both the H5 and N1 proteins. This testing was performed for free, as the scientific information would be useful, and will probably be published in a scientific research journal. Kinexus has no plan to produce products based on this information itself.

The use of ostriches to produce antibodies could be of interest to Kinexus and many other companies in the future, but there have been no discussions in this regard with the UOF. While the case was before the courts, it was necessary to maintain independence, since as an expert witness my role is to serve the courts and not the Applicant or Respondents.

If the cull order is cancelled, I would like to continue the research into the nature and duration of the ostriches’ natural immunity for scientific publication purposes, since this fits into my university academic research. Kinexus has produced about 1600 antibodies against cancer proteins over the last 26 years. However, it is likely that the operations of Kinexus may be wound up within the next two years unless it is sold or acquired.

I have nothing to gain financially with respect to developing tests to track SARS-CoV-2 and influenza immunity, but I am looking to understand the parts of these viruses that are most likely to be immunoreactive, which will help in better diagnosing the extent and effectiveness of natural immunity.

2. Are ethics reviews needed?

Q: The owners of the farm have prepared an official statement about the antibody research, but we are interested in more specific details. Are there any organizations or government bodies involved in approving animal research experiments?

A: All government funded research and research conducted in university and hospital labs with animals is reviewed by an animal ethics committee to ensure that experimental animals are treated humanely and that the research has merit.

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Q: So potentially for the duration of the collaboration between the UOF and Dr. Tsukamoto an ethics review done through his university might have been in place. It sounds like you yourself were only doing specific testing prior to CFIA’s involvement with the farm, so no ethics review was needed, but if the cull is cancelled and you were to engage in research your university would need to get involved with such a review?

A: The requirement for an animal care review is usually not needed for antibody production in animals using standard practices. The Kinexus research is not conducted in a university facility, and the housing, injections and maintenance of the animals is performed at a certified farm for this purpose in the San Diego area. It is usually with human subjects that an ethics board approval is required.

3. Could injection contents be contagious?

Q: So the ostriches are producing antibodies for COVID-19 and Avian Influenza. What are they being injected with? Is it a live virus and could it somehow spread to other birds, animals or humans?

A: The antigens used to elicit antibody products in the birds are not from injection of live virus or genetic vaccines. These are highly purified preparations of recombinant spike protein originally produced in bacteria or insect cells using the spike protein gene from SARS-CoV-2. The Chinese Sinovac or Novavax COVID-19 vaccines work with such antigen. They represent only part of the virus, and there is no way that they can replicate after injection into an animal.

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Q: So could any of the ostriches who got sick have been responding to injections of antigens from highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI)? Did the farm do any test injections for avian flu before the outbreak?

A: The genome sequencing conducted by the CFIA of the virus swab samples retrieved from the two dead UOF ostriches confirmed that the virus was consistent with strains of H5N1 well known to be circulating in the wild birds population in BC. In other words, we assume the ostriches’ illness to be consistent with what the wild ducks brought with them. To my knowledge, no recombinant proteins or their parts derived from the HPAI, had been injected into the hens for antibody production. Even if this had been done, this would never show up in a PCR test, which specifically tests for genetic material and not proteins.

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Q: Where would the researchers get the spike protein? Can any farmer obtain and work with spike protein outside of an official research context?

A: There are many commercial sources of purified recombinant spike protein and other SARS-CoV-2 proteins that can be purchased, and there are companies that can produced these reagents in custom services. I have worked with a collaborator at the University of Victoria who produces such SARS-CoV-2 proteins in his lab. At Kinexus, we make fragments of these viral proteins in order to elicit the production of antibodies in rabbits very successfully.

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Q: So just to clarify, for this type of research, you would NOT be required to meet the biosafety standards of a level 3 lab?

A: Live influenza virus, if it is attenuated, is regularly handled in non-laboratory conditions, and biosafety is not an issue. Live, weakened strains of influenza is what is commonly injected into people when they get seasonal influenza vaccines in drug stores, health clinics and doctors offices.

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Q: If a bird is inoculated with a dead virus how long should the owners need to wait if they want to sell it into the food chain safely? Do antibodies in response to a virus in a recovered bird long after the injection pose any risks to human or animal health?

A: If a bird is injected with dead virus, it can be sold immediately. If the owners want to have a strong immune response, it would take about 2 weeks to get robust immunity.

4. Asking about similar work in other places

Q: I note that Dr. Tsukamoto has been publishing about his work with ostriches for a quite some time. I heard he has about 50 ostriches in his Japanese facility, which is where he did his trials. In 2008 he was already demonstrating how ostriches can make antibodies against Avian Influenza and his team published on this in 2011. In 2009, Forbes magazine wrote about his work with swine flu. Are you aware of Dr. Tsukamoto having also done similar work with MERS, Ebola or other pathogens? And would you know if the UOF ostriches received antigen injections for anything other than COVID-19 and Avian Flu?

A: I am only familar with the work that Dr. Tsukamoto has been doing with SARS-CoV-2. However, there is no reason why this kind of work could not also be done with other viruses, especially if the work is being performed using individual viral proteins or fragments of these proteins.

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Q: So with regards to COVID-19 treatments, the term monoclonal antibodies came up a lot. Are these also made via animal production? Could this be something that ostrich farms could get involved with? And do you have any idea of how many ostriches we have in Canada?

A: Only the first stage of monoclonal antibody production may require the injection of an animal, usually a mouse or rabbit. Once an isolated B-cell that produces the antibody is fused with a cancer cell, the resulting hybridoma cell and its progeny can continually produce large amounts of the same monoclonal antibody. Using the phage display technique, animals are not required for the monoclonal antibody production. Once a gene for a monoclonal antibody is identified and transplanted into a suitable vector for uptake into cells, it can be produced in bacterial cells.

There is no other farm in Canada with such a large flock and such a quality genetic stock. Over the last 20 years, the number of ostrich farms in Canada has been in rapid decline. I would be surprised if there are more than 2500 ostriches in the whole of Canada. There is no good data on this as there are no longer any ostrich associations in the country. It is estimated that culling this flock would amount to at least a 15% reduction nationwide.

As for antibody production, chickens can be successfully used to make desirable antibodies, but this is not as efficient as with ostrich eggs, which are substantially larger and provide more than 20-times the yield. The antibodies found in the ostrich eggs will be more uniform in their properties since they are from the same animal, which can lay over 30 eggs in a season and for up to 55 years, and their antibodies are particularly robust for industrial applications. They can remain functional after subjection to boiling temperatures as well as a wide pH range from highly acidic to highly basic conditions.

5. Antibody experiments involving masks

Q: In the official statement from May 21, the owners mention that Dr. Tsukamoto’s mask research did not involve antibodies from the UOF. Given the research on how ineffective masks were at stopping viral transmission, what is your take on Dr. Tsuamoto’s experimental coating of masks with ostrich derived antibodies?

A: I agree that the use of cloth, surgical and N95 masks by themselves is not particularly effective in providing protection against getting or transmitting SARS-CoV-2 virus and COVID-19, nor influenza. However, coating the inside of a mask with antibodies that recognize and bind to the spike and membrane proteins of SARS-CoV-2 has a good chance of working, as demonstrated by research done by Dr. Tsukamoto in Japan.

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Q: One of the articles found about the work at UOF cited Karen Espersen as having said: “Working with a lab back east, we inoculated our hens with the dead COVID-19 virus...last year we were able to block 99.9 per cent of the coronavirus if it was infused in a face mask.” How would this work while still allowing a mask wearer to breathe? Given that most people are aware of the many adverse effects of prolonged mask wearing, can you think of examples when such masks would be safe and useful?

A: I think Karen meant to say the hens were inoculated with SARS-CoV-2 spike protein, not the whole virus. The antibodies are large molecules, but tens of times smaller than the influenza virus itself. Consequently, the antibody coating has little impact on the size of the pores in these masks and breathability.

6. Timing of CFIA’s Request at Landfill BEFORE the Outbreak

Q: What is your response to the revelation that the Regional District of Central Kootenay (RDCK) was approached already in November 2024 by CFIA agents about the possibility of receiving a large number of animal carcasses, given that no UOF ostriches even fell ill until December 10 2024?

A: I would not be surprised if the CFIA was watching out for an excuse to terminate the ostriches on the farm because of the biosecurity risk that the agency appears to be concerned about with animals roaming around semi-freely in the open. I seriously doubt however, that the ostriches were infected by people, especially with ill intent.

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Q: Can you please explain biosecurity risk? Does the CFIA worry about infected birds jumping the fence, running into the forest and infecting other wildlife?

A: This is rather weak argument, especially since the ostriches have already erradicated the virus from their bodies. However, even if an ostrich that was actively infected and got away into the wild, the avian virus very poorly infects mammals. It would be more likely that the avian virus would successfully infect wild birds that the ostrich would somehow come into contact with. However, the wild birds have already had multiple repeated exposures to wild migratory birds that have been infected with the same virus. As a flightless bird, the ostrich would not get very far in the wild.

7. Fighting infection or driving new variants?

Q: Some people are aware that continually vaccinating into a pandemic with "leaky vaccines" is what has driven the number of new variants. I realize one of the projects Dr. Tusukamoto has spoken of is to create aerosolized nasal sprays that would allow people to spray antibodies into their noses, antibodies to whatever the currently circulating pathogen is. Is there a way that nasal spray with ostrich antibodies can also DRIVE the creation of new variants?

A: This really does not make sense, and is quite a different situation from where one is dealing with antibiotics or antivirals, which are small molecule drugs with a single target site. Antibiotic or antiviral resistance could in principle develop from heavy usage of such drugs. However, polyclonal antibodies target many different parts of viruses and bacteria, and this reduces the opportunity for any kind of resistance due to mutation of these microbes. This is why natural immunity is so effective against fighting future infections even when the viruses and bacteria have undergone mutations. With natural immunity, a polyclonal antibody response is produced with hundreds of different antibodies against a pathogen. Typically, the genetic structure of proteins is altered only within a few percent by mutation, so most of the polyclonal antibodies are still effective against variants.

8. Testing policies and fines

Q: On the topic of laboratory testing, in their official statement released on May 21, 2025, the UOF owners explain that

“Independent ‘gold-standard’ tissue testing and any other testing of any kind is prohibited, with threats of $200,000 fines and/or six months in jail for conducting our own tests, as per Health of Animals Act Section 66.b.”

Have you heard of such a high fine and/or jail time in any other case or country? Is this unusual? Can it be a new addition to CFIA policy?

A: It is very strange to me that the CFIA would not allow independent testing of the UOF ostriches. I would have thought that more information about the immunological status of the ostriches against H5N1 influenza would be of great interest to the agency. I am not aware of similar penalties that might be impose by a similar agency in another country.

9. Questions specific to PCR testing

Q: I am aware that PCR testing is limited and contradictory and, for humans, is not recommended as a diagnostic tool beyond a certain cycle threshold, and without checking for symptoms. First of all, would there be such a thing as “asymptomatic” avian flu in any animals?

A: If someone is asymptomatic, technically they don’t have a disease or illness. However, it is possible that someone may be infected, and have no symptoms, and might still transmit the influenza virus. However, the rate of transmission would be substantially less than someone who had disease symptoms. Most flu symptoms reflect a response of the body to improve the effectiveness of immune system (e.g., raising body temperature) and cleaning out viruses or bacteria (e.g., post-nasal drip, coughing, diarrhea). In such cases, with illness, the viral load and potential for infectivity is much higher.

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Q: Secondly, the cull order was issued 41 minutes after the test result was purportedly positive for only the H5 and H7 part of the equation. Was this test done using a PCR test? What about testing for the N protein a little later on? Was a different test type used?

A: It was a PCR test that was used to test for H5 and H7. There was no PCR testing for the N1 protein. Later the entire genome of the recovered virus was subjected to full genome sequencing, and this revealed that the virus had the N1 type.

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Q: We know that for COVID-19 testing, in January 2021, the World Health Organization required that those doing the PCR tests were supposed to “provide the Ct value in the report to the requesting health care provider” because “as disease prevalence decreases, the risk of false positive increases”. The WHO also stated: “Where test results do not correspond with the clinical presentation, a new specimen should be taken and retested using the same or different Nucleic Acid Testing technology.” I take it this meant that if patients (or ostriches) did not have symptoms of illness and their test results came back positive, a new specimen should be taken and retested. Have you ever heard of the CIFA getting a second specimen whenever there was a mismatch in the patient (ostrich) presentation and the test results? And did the CFIA provide the farm with an indication of the cycle threshold levels following testing on the swabs collected from the two dead ostriches as advised by the WHO for COVID-19 testing in humans back in 2021?

A: It is clear that the PCR tests were performed with more than 36 cycles, and likely 45 cycles (which would give false-positives >95% of the time). It is clear that a second round of PCR testing was performed at the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg, likely at the same high thermal cycles. However, the full genome analysis would be the most definitive and accurate, which is what was performed after the issuance of the cull order. I note that the CFIA have observed about a hundred reassortment of the genomes of the influenza virus that it has recovered from other influenza outbreaks at commerical farms. This means that they likely routinely perform full genome analysis of the influenza virus in recovered samples from infected birds.

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Q: I read in “Down the COVID-19 Rabbit Hole”, a book you and others worked on, that for COVID-19 Canada’s National Microbiology Laboratory ran a functional virology assay to determine at which cycle count viruses are identified that can still kill other cells. They determined that viral samples identified in PCR tests run under 24 cycles can still infect and kill other cells. But that viral particles remaining once a PCR test that run over 24 cycles fail to be infectious. I have a few questions here: If for COVID-19, the National Microbiology Lab determined 24 cycles to be the cut off point, why wasn’t all COVID-19 PCR testing done in Canada stopped after 24 cycles? And has a similar functional virology assay been done for Avian Flu? If so, what would be the cycle threshold for determining infectivity of Avian Flu samples? What would be the point of going all the way up to 45 cycles as you hint that the CFIA might have done?

A: This is a good question, and the answer that public health officials have explained to me is that they would rather get false-positives and not take the chance of missing an actual infection. I expect the problem of false-positives with high thermal cycle numbers in the PCR test for SARS-CoV-2 detection, is equally true to influenza virus RNA detection. Both are respiratory RNA viruses that are similar in size, although the genome of influenza is about a third of the size of th SARS-CoV-2 virus.

10. Variations, Mutations & Combatting Hybrids

Q: One of the CFIA agents had said that the pattern of illness on the farm didn't exactly match avian flu. Could this be because of the immune system of ostriches, who over many years, had likely already encountered the pathogen before?

A: This is likely true, but also it appears that the strain of H5N1 influenza that infected the ostriches was weaker than the HPAI variant that the CFIA was worried about, i.e., the 2.3.4.4b clade.

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Q: I know that every year, human influenza vaccines are updated to (hopefully) match the circulating variants. Are the antibodies produced by the ostriches based on injection of antigens for one particular variant going to be effective against new variants years later?

A: Most likely yes, because the mutations will only affect about 1-3% or less of the overall structure of the viral proteins, and at least 97% of the proteins will be exactly the same between the original and emerging new variants of an influenza strain. However, there could be reassortments and emergence of new hybrid variants of influenza from mixing of strains. However, a person may have antibodies already against each of the two strains that produced the hybrid, and these antibodies would be highly effective in recognizing and combating the hybrid virus.

11. Back to the very first use of PCR for COVID-19 testing

Q: So other questions circulating among those covering the CFIA cull order relate to the validity of viruses in general and “genetic sequences of viruses” incorporated into PCR testing. I am aware that in August 2020 the Corman-Drosten report initially set up the first PCR test to respond to a theoretical genetic sequence

“supplied by a laboratory in China, because at the time neither control material of infectious (“live”) or inactivated SARS-CoV-2 nor isolated genomic RNA of the virus was available to the authors”.

Corman and Drosten first described their “diagnostic workflow and RT-qPCR protocol for detection and diagnostics” based on this theoretical genetic sequence.

Next, a paper written in November 2020 pointed at ten flaws in the Corman-Drosten report. At the time of writing, these critical authors stated:

“To date no validation has been performed by the authorship based on isolated SARS-CoV-2 viruses or full length RNA thereof.”

Are all the public health COVID-19 testing labs still using that original PCR test, or has a more recent one based on an actual sequencing of an actual viral specimen been made public for all labs, or does each country set up its own PCR test based on its own assays (if that is the right word)?

A: With well designed primer sequences of DNA, PCR tests can be highly accurate when used a reasonable thermal cycle thresholds. With each thermal cycle, the amount of DNA is doubled, so with, for example, 35 thermal cycles, the original genetic material is increased to 2 to the 35th power or 344 trillion times. The number of times that a thermal cycle is needed increase the amount of genetic materials to be detectable is a reflection of how much starting genetic material is in a sample. With a requirement for higher thermal cycles, this means that the amount of original genetic material in a sample is extremely low. To cause a viral infection that will induce sickness, the viral load has to be sufficiently high to initially overcome the immune system. To date, tens of thousands of different variants of the Wuhan SARS-CoV-2 have been fully sequenced for their genome. This is how we can accurately track the emergence of new variants of the virus. PCR tests are being continually updated to allow tracking of these new variants.

12. When FOI requests come up empty are there simply no viruses?

Q: Then we have people who have been challenging government health institutions and other health organizations via Freedom of Information requests to produce paperwork showing proof of the complete isolation of various viruses. When these institutions have nothing to show, some people simply assume that those institutions were likely not in charge of making policies and therefore do not have any such evidence. Others then deduce that therefore viruses do not exist.

What is your take on this issue?

A: Some of those making these Freedom of Information (FOI) requests insist on data that shows the complete isolation of a specific virus, which is almost impossible to do, since you need an assay in order to track the purification of a virus, and it can only replicate in a host. Once released from a host, it is mixed with hundreds of thousands of other distinct molecular structures. Fortunately, we can use antibodies as tools to help purify and track viruses, which I have routinely done in my own research. There are literally tens of thousands of labs that isolate and sequence genetic material and track viruses in the world today. Bacteria are much larger than viruses and can be seen with a light microscope. However, viruses and even their proteins can only be seen by electron microscopes and x-ray crystallography.

These types of FOI requests have yielded zero results from universities because the specific question is requesting data on full isolation of a virus separate from all other viruses, bacteria, fungi or any other large structure that can be derived from tissues or cells. Nowadays, scientists don’t need to undertake such endeavours to get the answers to important questions about viruses and their actions.

If the virus-sceptics were right, there would be no way that I could produce viral protein in cells, and specifically track their production with antibodies, which are based on the genetic sequences of these viruses. Moreover, I would not have been able to identify the specific parts of the 28 different proteins encoded by the SARS-CoV-2 genome that people produce antibodies against, and the genetic COVID-19 vaccines would have been impossible to produce.

13. Lucrative Eggs or Community Fundraising needed?

Q: I have just a few more questions. Thank you for taking the time thus far.

Some people are wondering what the fundraising monies are supposed to cover. I assume to offset the lack of income since the CFIA forbade the owners from letting anything leave the farm. And I assume for legal costs, for example for the expert reports you submitted for the Judicial Review.

A: Although I have prepared four expert reports already for the legal team, I have not charged anything for work that I have done. Working on this case has actually hurt my own business as I have been very distracted by this case. I have nothing to gain financially, and frankly I would rather be doing other biomedical research. However, when I hear the kind of nonsense coming from the CFIA and others in mainstream and social media, knowing what I know, I feel a moral responsibility to set the record straight.

From what I have learned from Dave Bilinisky is that he and Karen have put all of their profits back into building the UOF and don’t have extra funds to pay the legal expenses, never mind maintaining the ostrich flock.

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Q: In your expert report, you indicated that a single ostrich egg can be worth $48,000. This got people thinking the ostrich farm really shouldn’t run fundraisers at all. As I understand it prior to the lockdowns, the farm was basically selling ostrich meat and oil. The egg-based antibody research angle only came about during the lockdowns and their meat & oil processing plants had to shut down. So Karen and her partner stumbled across the work of Dr. Tsukamoto in Japan. This still does not mean that from that time on, they were being paid $48,000 an egg. Any comment?

A: My statement in my expert report about the value of a single ostrich egg was prefaced with the situation where the ostrich has been injected with a portion of a cancer protein of high interest for research purposes, based on the yield of purified antibody expected from a single egg and the standard commercial price of these kind of antibodies, which is about $400 per 100 µg. I calculated from typical yields that we obtain from the serum of 1 rabbit, which is ~1.5 mg, that 12 mg could be purified from a single ostrich egg. 12 mg would correct to about $48,000. The farm has been selling eggs for $500 each for such purposes, and letting other companies provide the immunogens and purifying and testing the antibodies. So this could eventually turn out to be a lucrative business, but so far the UOF has only been at the beginning stage of running this type of business. It is very important to appreciate that the antibodies would have to be made against important targets in biomedical research to generate such returns. However, with proper scientific guidance, the UOF could do this.

Q: Thank you, Dr. Pelech. I really appreciate you taking the time to provide all of this information to help us better understand what we are hearing about the research work at Universal Ostrich Farm.

:-)

Part 3: Written Statement submitted to CSNews by Dr. Steven Pelech on May 21, 2025

In considering the arguments used to justify Justice Zinn’s decision to uphold the culling of the ostrich herd with the order provided by the Canadian Food Inspection Agency (CFIA) in early January, 20205, the following points should first be considered when reviewing his decision.

1. The judge made his decision primarily based on what was known after the initial testing of the two dead birds at the Universal Ostrich Farms (UOF) at the end of December 2024. What the CFAI actually knew, before they issued the culling order, was using a PCR test designed to test for influenza hemagglutinin H5 and H7 genetic material, that they had a positive result. At the thermal cycle number of this test, which exceeded 36 cycles, the test has a greater than 90% false positive rate. The CFAI did not know specifically at the time that the virus detected was H5N1 or even necessarily a highly pathogenic avian influenza virus. It should be noted that to qualify as highly pathogenic, lethality has to be 75% or high in an infected chicken herd. However, to issue a cull order, the standard CFAI policy is that if a poultry flock is even suspected of having an H5N1 infection, and even a single bird tests positive for H5 or H7, then the entire flock to which that bird has been exposed must be exterminated.

2. Later, when genomic sequencing by the National Microbiology Laboratory in Winnipeg was performed on the swab samples taken from the two dead ostriches, and this information was not disclosed to the UOF until the latter half of March, it turned out that the influenza virus recovered from these birds was a combination of high and low pathogenicity virus. It would not be expected to be as highly pathogenic.

3. The fact that none of the birds on the UOF that were resident prior to 2021 died from the recent avian influenza outbreak indicated that they must have had priority immunity. The 69 birds that died out of the remaining birds that came to the farm after 2020 corresponds to a lethality rate of around 31%, which was much lower than expected rates that have been recorded up to 60% in ostriches that have not been subjected to culling, for example in South Africa.

4. Independent testing by Kinexus Bioinformatics Corporation of egg yolks from 18/18 birds recovered in the summer of 2024, prior to the December, 2024, outbreak, already showed the presence of antibodies against both the H5 and N1 proteins, confirming that the birds already had a degree of natural existing immunity. The CFIA cull order prevented any test or treatment of the UOF herd after its issuance. The CFAI argued in court that it was irrelevant if the UOF ostriches had subsequently developed natural immunity with respect to their decision to cull the birds.

5. Since the death of the last UOF ostrich from infection on January 15, 2025, there have been no deaths from infectious disease, and all of the birds have been healthy. This is only possible if the birds have developed robust natural immunity that is fully protective. These birds are highly unlikely to have the H5N1 virus if they have antibodies, and they certainly are at no risk of transmitting the virus to each other, to wild birds or to humans that come in contact with the birds.

6. The decision of the CFAI to cull all birds in a flock or herd upon evidence of a single PCR confirmed case of H5 or H7 positivity is an internal decision of the CFAI. This is not a requirement of the World Organization for Animal Health, which allows for regaining of disease-free status after one year if no other outbreaks occur in a zone. Canada is divided into zones with respect to commercial poultry. The UOF is in its own zone, and allowing the disease to “burn-out” at the UOF zone does not affect the disease-free status of the other zones in BC and Canada.

7. The CFAI, according to its own rules, has discretion with respect to how to handle an outbreak of H5N1 in unusual cases, which is certainly a situation with the UOF ostriches. It is plainly evident that the ostriches on the farm were not being used for human consumption but for research purposes. In fact, the ostriches were being used to develop diagnostic and therapeutic products, which by the World Organization for Animal Heath’s definitions would mean that these birds do not qualify as “poultry” and would not technically be subject-able to the culling order. Moreover, the UOF ostriches were being used to develop antibody products to help reduce the risk of infectious diseases like COVID-19, such as masks and filters that capture the SARS-CoV-2 virus.

8. Also according to CFAI policy, the agency is not required to pay fair compensation for the value of animals that are culled when they issue an order. Justice Zinn ruled that the compensation cannot exceed $3000 per bird as per CFIA policy. Therefore, the true value of these birds will not be offered in compensation. Due to the potential commercial value of the antibodies against influenza H5N1 and SARS-CoV-2 in the eggs from this flock, the value of each egg laying bird exceeds this number in the order of 10-fold. Note that unlike chickens which can be purchased for a few dollars about 90 days after being chicks, ostriches take more than a year to even become reproductive, but can remain fertile for 55 years, and produce typically 30 of the largest bird eggs available on the planet in a season. It takes a few years before an ostrich is comfortable with a human handler, so it takes years to re-establish an ostrich herd that can be properly handled by farm workers.

9. The UOF herd represents a substantial percentage of the entire ostrich population in Canada, likely greater than 15%. Culling these birds will not only reduce the genetic diversity of this species in Canada, but further damage the industry in Canada that has wider implications for biomedical applications. Killing these ostriches further endangers food security in BC and Canada, since it reduces diversity in commercial animals, and makes the province and country more vulnerable to future infections with new pathogenic viruses that might be even more deadly in the other more commonly used birds in commercial operations.

10. The CFAI has been preoccupied with the notion that genetic mutation of the H5N1 may allow it to develop greater infectivity and pathogenicity in humans, and result in the next human virus pandemic. However, the H5N1 strain has been known for almost 70 years, and it has yet to pose a serious threat for human disease. There is no scientific evidence that the H5N1 virus, when it has rarely infected a human host, has been able to spread to and cause disease in another human.

11. The decision from the Regional District of Central Kootenay to delay acceptance of the carcasses of the culled ostriches is a little confusing, although the insistence that each bird is tested could buy valuable time. It is unclear whether the birds test H5N1-positive that they will be accepted or rejected from the landfill. If the birds test positive, then the sense I got was that the birds were deemed a biohazard and would be rejected. However, if the birds are negative, then the question arises why should the CFIA be killing them in the first place. Part of this decision by the district is based on the notion that influenza virus may remain replication-competent for years in water and soil, which is a concern raised by Justice Zinn, based on the material submitted by the CFIA. This misleading idea was rebutted by both Dr. Bridle and Dr. Pelech. It should be realized that influenza is an RNA-containing virus. While DNA is more stable in the environment, RNA is very unstable.

12. According to the CFIA, there has been about 531 outbreaks of H5N1 HPAI in commercial poultry flocks in Canada in the last four years, and with one exception, the exposed birds were all subjected to the stamping out policy, resulting in the deaths of over 14.5 million commercial birds. It is notable that these outbreaks are seasonal in the late fall and early winter, and the frequency of these outbreaks was unchanged by the practice of culling of the infected flocks in 2024 compared to 2023. During the court hearing, CFAI disclosed that there were about a hundred of such instances of genetic reassortments of H5N1 influenza genes in the past few years, which indicates a rate of about 19% assuming that the virus was fully sequenced in each outbreak. Such reassortments of influenza genes are generally very rare. This requires co-infection of the same host, and the same cells in the host with two different strains at the same time, and the repackaging of these genes in the same new virus particles. This supports the notion that a substantial portion of the H5N1 influenza that is now in wild migratory birds is no longer highly pathogenic avian influenza, but hybrids of lower pathogenicity.

13. The culling of the UOF herd represents a huge loss to the scientific community to understand the effectiveness of natural immunity post-infection with H5N1 virus in birds. This is over and above the value of these ostriches for the antibodies that they have produced against H5N1 influenza and SARS-CoV-2, which is what these birds were originally being used for. Their antibodies could be used for diagnostic tests to identify new outbreaks of infections with these viruses as well as therapeutic antibodies for treatment of influenza and COVID-19.

By applying the stamping out policy at the earliest signs of an H5 or H7 influenza infection, we presently have no idea on how lethal the currently circulating strains of influenza are in wild birds to the domestic flocks. Normally, pandemics subside when less lethal and more infectious strains of viruses emerge from mutation and dominate and replace highly pathogenic versions. It is likely that such a phenomenon is already happening with H5N1 clade 2.3.4.4b, which was responsible for HPAI cases earlier in the recent pandemic in commercial livestock.

CSNews has previously addressed the Canadian Food Inspection Agency’s Depopulation/Cull Order at the Universal Ostrich Farm in Edgewood, BC.

We also invite journalists and policy makers to consider provided additional background information related to proposed legislation intended to further legalize controversial pandemic prevention or mitigations measures (for example Bill C-293 introduced and nearly passed by the previous Parliament.)

(Posted in reverse order.)

See also:

How Would You Prevent a Pandemic? - A quick quiz on Bill C-293